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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
These cross-appeals arise from the District Court's 
judgment following a bench trial in favor of Dianne Evans 
and against Durham Life Insurance Company ("Durham") 
and Peoples Security Life Insurance Company ("Peoples") on 
Evans's Title VII sex discrimination counterclaim; in favor 
of Durham/Peoples on Evans's claim for punitive damages; 
and in favor of Evans on Durham/Peoples' claim for 
Evans's breach of a non-competition agreement. Most 
importantly, the appeal of Durham/Peoples, which comes 
in the wake of the Supreme Court's landmark sexual 
harassment decisions last Term, Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998), and Burlington Industries, 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998), requires us to 
explicate several of the ways in which employers may be 
held liable under Faragher and Ellerth. In the course of so 
doing, we must also flesh out the notion of tangible adverse 
action. 
 
Evans was a successful life insurance salesperson 
earning close to six figures with Metropolitan Life Insurance 
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Co. when she was recruited away and began working for 
Durham. She enjoyed even greater success in herfirst two 
years with Durham, but when Durham was acquired by 
Peoples and new management took over, her situation 
changed for the worse. According to Evans's trial evidence, 
essentially credited by the District Court, the new 
management resented her for being a successful woman 
and set out to undermine her, humiliating her personally 
with sexist remarks and crude sexual advances, and 
stripping her of the support she needed to do her job, 
support that had been a negotiated condition of her 
employment at Durham. Ultimately, when her private office 
was taken away and critical files mysteriously disappeared, 
she resigned and began to work for a competing insurance 
company. Durham thereupon sued Evans, seeking an 
injunction and damages for breach of a noncompetition 
agreement Evans had signed while in Durham's employ. 
Evans counterclaimed, alleging sex discrimination, 
defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
 
The District Court found that the noncompetition 
agreement was no longer in effect and that Evans had 
suffered a hostile work environment. It entered judgment in 
her favor for $310,156 in lost earnings and fringe benefits 
and $100,000 for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. It found against Evans on her defamation claim. 
 
Durham makes numerous claims on appeal. (We will now 
refer to Durham and Peoples, Durham's successor, as 
"Durham.") It challenges the District Court's fact finding on 
the ground that the allegedly offending incidents were so 
few and far between and their veracity so suspect that we 
should set the verdict aside as clearly erroneous. We 
decline that invitation. Durham also disputes its liability for 
the acts of its supervisory employees under Ellerth and 
Faragher. We conclude that Durham is not entitled to the 
affirmative defense that Evans unreasonably failed to use 
an available effective sexual harassment policy because the 
defense is only available in the absence of tangible adverse 
employment action, and Evans suffered such adverse 
action. The concept of a tangible adverse employment 
action is not limited to changes in compensation, although 
Evans's pay was certainly affected by the actions taken 
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against her. "Tangible adverse employment action" includes 
the loss of significant job benefits or characteristics, such 
as the resources necessary for an employee to do his or her 
job; that Evans suffered such loss is detailed infra. 
 
Durham also contends that it is not liable for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress because Pennsylvania 
workers' compensation law preempts Evans's claim. 
Ultimately we need not resolve this difficult question, 
because we find that the award may be upheld under Title 
VII. Additionally, Evans challenges the District Court's 
refusal to award punitive damages, but we find this ruling 
to have been fairly within the court's discretion. Finally, 
Durham takes issue with the District Court's back pay 
award, but we uphold that also as within the court's 
discretion, particularly given Durham's acts after Evans left 
Durham's employment. 
 
Durham alleges that Evans was bound by a covenant not 
to compete and argues that the collective bargaining 
agreement required her to grieve rather than sue. The 
District Court found that a vice president's statement to 
Evans that the covenant and the collective bargaining 
agreement were no longer in force estops Durham from 
enforcing them against her. This finding is not clearly 
erroneous. In view of all these conclusions, we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court in its entirety. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
The evidence adduced at trial, which we view in the light 
most favorable to Evans, the prevailing party at trial, see 
Keith v. Truck Stops Corp., 909 F.2d 743, 745 (3d Cir. 
1990), showed the following facts. Evans was an extremely 
successful life insurance salesperson. She worked at Met 
Life for seventeen years, and in her last few years there she 
consistently earned $90,000 per year. Durham recruited 
her in 1991, promising her that she would have her own 
office and secretary, as well as unlimited phone and mailing 
costs paid for by Durham. When Evans joined Durham, she 
signed a non-competition agreement, which provided that, 
if she left, she could not sell insurance to Durham 
customers for a limited time. At Durham, she was covered 
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by the collective bargaining agreement in place between 
Durham and its agents while that agreement was in effect. 
 
Durham was a "home service" or "debit" insurance 
company whose business generally came from door-to-door 
sales. Evans, however, was recruited as an "ordinary life 
agent," which meant that she sold a different type of policy. 
She worked almost exclusively from her office, encouraging 
existing debit customers to upgrade their policies. Evans's 
special skills and support system facilitated her success in 
the new job. She earned $128,000 in 1991 and $119,000 in 
1992, mainly from commissions. 
 
In 1991, Capitol Holding Company purchased Durham. 
In 1992, Capitol assigned the management of Durham to 
Peoples Security Life Insurance Company, and Peoples 
managers took over in October. Evans was the only full- 
time female life insurance agent at that location; there were 
thirty male agents. The collective bargaining agreement 
between Durham and its agents expired in November 1992. 
When it expired, Peoples unilaterally reduced the 
compensation rate of the agents. At that point, Tom 
Biancardi, a regional vice-president who was then 
negotiating with the union, told Evans that the collective 
bargaining agreement and the non-competition agreement 
were no longer in force. After that time, no new collective 
bargaining agreement was put in place. 
 
The new managers, particularly William McKaskill and 
Doug Sebastionelli, believed that Evans should not 
continue to receive special treatment.1  They told her that 
she did not fit the profile for a debit life insurance 
company: Her clothes and shoes were too expensive and 
she dressed too well for the job. McKaskill told her that she 
"made too much money for a goddamn woman." In March 
1993, William Owens, the acting agency manager, asked 
Evans to go dancing "into the fields with him" and 
reminded her that he had the power to fire her if she did 
not behave as he wished. The next morning, he placed a 
newspaper article on her desk discussing a large verdict 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. McKaskill and Sebastionelli were Associate Customer Service Unit 
Leaders who were three levels above Evans in the hierarchy until mid- 
1993, when one of those levels was eliminated. 
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that Peoples had obtained against another life insurance 
company because of an agent who moved business from 
Peoples to the other company. At that time, Owens told her 
that if she reported the previous night's incident or if she 
quit and tried to take her business with her, Peoples would 
sue and "attach her house before she left the courtroom." 
Evans was frightened but did nothing because she wanted 
to succeed in the restructured company. 
 
Evans suffered repeated slights from the new 
management. At an awards dinner, the top-selling agents 
were honored for selling more than $25,000 in premiums 
during a set period of time. Evans was the top producer, 
but while the exact sales numbers of the male agents were 
announced, Evans was only identified as selling in excess 
of the required minimum. Evans felt that she had been 
humiliated in front of her colleagues and her son, who was 
also present. At a training session in June 1993, she was 
publicly mocked for her walk and her speech by Chuck 
Gardner, an agency sales manager. Evans tried to retain 
the business of an important client, the Mercy Votech 
School, but the school administrators had questions that 
Evans needed legal help to answer. Although she was 
promised legal assistance from the home office, no one 
showed up at the scheduled meeting and Evans lost the 
account. Evans testified that male agents routinely received 
legal help when necessary. When she tried to explain to 
McKaskill what had happened, he cut her off and asked, 
"What do you know about annuities, you're only a woman." 
 
The new managers fired Evans's secretary and attempted 
to get her to leave her private office. McKaskill came into 
her office and began to use it as his own on several 
occasions, disrupting Evans's work and ignoring her 
discomfort and embarrassment. In June or July 1993, 
McKaskill grabbed Evans's buttocks from behind while she 
was bending over her files and told her that she smelled 
good. She immediately left the office and never entered it 
again when McKaskill was at her desk. She did not report 
the incident because she wanted to avoid further 
humiliation and because she believed that McKaskill's 
position would allow him to decide her fate. 
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Management assigned Evans numerous "lapsed books," 
policies that were no longer active because the policy- 
holders had switched insurance companies. The agent 
assigned to a lapsed book was supposed to try to reactivate 
the policies. These were debit policies rather than the 
ordinary policies with which Evans was used to dealing. 
Evans initially responded to the changes by working hard 
on the lapsed books and performing well. However, because 
of the way commissions were calculated, the assignment of 
lapsed books had a severe negative impact on the 
calculation of Evans's bonus. Male agents were not 
assigned a similarly heavy load of lapsed books. 
 
The problems came to a head in September 1993, when 
Jim La Grossa, the agency manager, told Evans that she 
was being transferred to another location. He instructed her 
to clear her furniture out of her office and assemble her 
files for the move. Evans complied, but when she returned 
on the next work day, she was informed that she was not 
moving at all. She was advised by her manager, John 
Heyman, that she no longer had an office and that her 
former office was now his conference room. La Grossa 
testified that Owens and McKaskill had pressured him for 
months to get Evans out of her office. 
 
The "non-move" had an even more important 
consequence than Evans's public loss of her office. In 
preparation for the move, Evans had assembled all her 
files. Her files were uniquely important to her because, in 
the transition from the Durham computer system to the 
Peoples system, billing problems had developed for certain 
customer accounts. As a result, Evans was authorized to 
open a special bank account in which she would deposit 
pre-paid premiums and then pay the premiums as they 
came due using money orders and small amounts of cash, 
which were kept with her files. On the day she was told 
that she had lost her office, she also discovered that her 
files, including the money orders and cash, were gone. At 
that point, Evans concluded that she had been effectively 
fired because it was impossible for her to work without her 
files. A few days later, Evans sent a resignation letter 
stating that she was resigning based on the sex 
discrimination she had suffered and that she would pursue 
her legal remedies. 
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After her resignation letter, Evans three times requested 
a final audit of her accounts. It is industry policy, and also 
the policy of both Durham and Peoples, to allow an agent 
a final exit audit upon request when he or she leaves an 
insurance company's employ. It was Heyman's duty as 
agency manager to assume responsibility for Evans'sfiles 
after she left the company until another salesperson was 
assigned her customers and "book of business." Heyman 
refused her audit requests because he believed that she 
was not entitled to an audit and because he was already 
conducting an audit of Evans's debit book of business. 
Heyman knew, however, that the debit book comprised only 
a part of her accounts in view of her large number of 
ordinary policies; 575 of her 1272 customers were ordinary 
life accounts. 
 
Evans then took a position at the Paul Revere Life 
Insurance Company. Heyman threatened to sue her if she 
moved any business from Durham/Peoples to Paul Revere. 
At Paul Revere, Evans replaced sixteen Durham/Peoples 
policies with Paul Revere policies. A male agent, Tom 
Burke, had moved to a different insurance company and 
replaced 170 Durham/Peoples policies, and Durham had 
not taken any action against him. Instead, Durham had 
assigned those lapsed policies to Evans. 
 
If Heyman had conducted a final audit or allowed Evans 
access to her files, the billing problems that soon developed 
could have been prevented. Because he did nothing, 
however, customers began to receive notices that there were 
problems with their policies. Durham then wrote to all of 
Evans's customers that Evans had terminated her 
employment with Durham and could no longer act on 
Durham's behalf. The letter precipitated numerous 
inquiries about pre-payments that had been made to 
Evans. Because of the billing problems, these inquiries 
soon became complaints, and Durham forwarded the 
complaints to the Pennsylvania Insurance Department. In 
approximately three-fourths of the complaint cases, Evans 
had worked with her sales manager, Tom Carl, on the 
policies, and on many Carl had signed the application and 
policy, but only Evans was mentioned in the complaint 
letters. 
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Early in 1994, Durham sued Evans to enforce the 
covenant not to compete, seeking an injunction and 
damages for breach and alleging that Evans had 
intentionally interfered with a contract (the non-competition 
agreement). Also in 1994, Heyman sent a letter to the 
Pennsylvania Insurance Department that inaccurately 
stated that Evans had filed only two of five replacement 
forms required to replace certain policies. Heyman knew 
that failure to file replacement forms was a serious offense 
that would subject Evans to investigation and probably 
sanctions by the Insurance Department. 
 
Before the events described above, Evans was in good 
mental health. After Peoples took over, she began to suffer 
from chest pains, severe headaches, nausea, and shortness 
of breath. When she started work at Paul Revere, her health 
improved, and she was in the management program at Paul 
Revere. She was the leading agency producer there until 
the litigation and the complaints to the Insurance 
Department began. After the lawsuit began and she learned 
of the complaints, her performance at Paul Revere declined 
sharply. She became absentminded, unable to concentrate 
on her duties, and obsessed with the litigation. According 
to Paul Revere, Evans no longer met the company's 
production requirements. She was dropped from the 
management program in late 1994, and her income was 
only $48,000 that year. In 1995, it dropped to $38,000, and 
it declined further to $28,000 the next year. Paul Revere 
estimated that she would only produce $15,000 in 
premiums for 1997. She would have been discharged but 
for the fact that she is on partial disability. Currently, she 
requires continuing mental health treatment to deal with 
her distress and depression. 
 
II. Fact Finding in the District Court 
 
In order to reject a district court's findings of fact, the 
reviewing court, after examining all the evidence, must be 
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed. When there are two permissible views of 
the evidence, the district court's choice between them 
cannot be clearly erroneous. See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, 
Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 525 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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Much of Evans's case against Durham comes down to a 
credibility contest. Evans says that certain incidents 
occurred and that Durham's managers had discriminatory 
motives. Durham disputes those claims, and argues, even 
on appeal, that Evans's factual position is so weak as to be 
unsupportable. Since Title VII does not have a 
corroboration requirement, Durham's attempts to resurrect 
its factual claims on appeal are unavailing.2 Although 
testimony on Durham's side contradicts Evans's, her story 
is facially plausible, and the district judge credited it. We 
see no basis for finding clear error here. See Anderson v. 
City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (when a 
district judge credits one of two opposed coherent and 
facially plausible stories and the story is not contradicted 
by extrinsic evidence, "that finding, if not internally 
inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error"). 
 
Durham complains that the District Court adopted 
Evans's proposed findings of fact with little alteration. 
Although we do not encourage verbatim adoption of 
proposed findings of fact, their review requires no greater 
scrutiny on appeal than other fact finding. See Lansford- 
Coaldale Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1215 
(3d Cir. 1993). The District Court's discussion following its 
findings of fact demonstrated a keen familiarity with the 
record. Moreover, the court declined to adopt all of Evans's 
proposed findings, which shows that it was exercising 
independent judgment.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The McKaskill incident is an example. Evans testified that McKaskill 
grabbed her buttocks from behind. No one else witnessed it and she did 
not tell anyone about it until the lawsuit. Durham argues that she is 
therefore not credible. Durham repeats these arguments about many of 
the specific instances of harassment to which Evans testified. This 
strategem fails. Credibility determinations are for the finder of fact. 
See 
United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1078 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 921 (3d Cir. 
1974). If the District Court found Evans a credible witness, it was 
perfectly correct to credit Evans's account even if she told no one at the 
time the harassment occurred. The only "prompt complaint" requirement 
in Title VII is the statute of limitations, and Evans's counterclaim was 
filed well within the statutory period. 
 
3. Durham objects that some of the findings of fact contradict Evans's 
own testimony about the timeline of events. Evans was occasionally 
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Durham's main objection to the District Court'sfindings 
appears to be that the court aggregated numerous events to 
support its finding of a hostile work environment. Some of 
these events were apparently triggered by sexual desire, 
some were sexually hostile, some were non-sexual but 
gender-based, and others were facially neutral. Wefind no 
error, because Title VII may be applied to all of these types 
of conduct. 
 
Title VII prohibits sex discrimination. Although"sex" has 
several common meanings, in Title VII it describes a 
personal characteristic, like race or religion. We generally 
presume that sexual advances of the kind alleged in this 
case are sex-based, whether the motivation is desire or 
hatred. Likewise, hostile or paternalistic acts based on 
perceptions about womanhood or manhood are sex-based 
or "gender-based." 
 
"Gender" has often been used to distinguish socially- or 
culturally-based differences between men and women from 
biologically-based sex differences, but we have not 
considered "sex" and "gender" to be distinct concepts for 
Title VII purposes. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
reliance on gendered stereotypes of appropriate female 
behavior is sex discrimination); cf. Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont 
De Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) 
(using "sex" and "gender" interchangeably), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 2532 (1997); Wilson v. Susquehanna Township 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
confused about when exactly certain incidents occurred, but it was 
hardly unreasonable for the court to have selected one of the timelines 
she offered. Moreover, Durham offers no explanation of why it would 
matter whether one of her superiors made his "pass" in May rather than 
June, which is the most that Durham's argument can be said to prove. 
Arguably, the more distant in time the event was from Evans's 
resignation, the less plausible is her claim that discrimination led her 
to 
quit, but since she alleged a continuing, long-term series of harassing 
events not limited to sexual propositions, feuding over dates is 
unhelpful. See Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 172 n.1 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(adoption of defendant's proposed findings of fact that contained 
inconsistencies with defendant's earlier admissions was legitimate and 
did not "so undermine the ultimate conclusion that the district court 
reached" as to require reversal). 
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Police Dep't, 55 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 1995) (characterizing a 
sexually hostile environment as evidence of gender bias). 
Therefore, we will treat the sexual misconduct and the 
gender-based mistreatment in this case as sex 
discrimination. The facially neutral mistreatment plus the 
overt sex discrimination, both sexual and non-sexual, in 
sum constituted the hostile work environment. See Aman v. 
Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir. 
1996) (acts of harassment, if motivated by sex or race, can 
constitute a hostile work environment regardless of their 
content); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 
1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (overtly sexual harassment is 
unnecessary to establish a sexually hostile work 
environment; discriminatory treatment is the only 
requirement). 
 
As we stated in Andrews, the record must be evaluated 
as a whole when we consider whether Evans proved her 
case: 
 
       Particularly in the discrimination area, it is often 
       difficult to determine the motivations of an action and 
       any analysis is filled with pitfalls and ambiguities. A 
       play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its 
       scenes but only on its entire performance, and 
       similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate 
       not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario. 
 
Id. at 1484; see also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing 
Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683 (1998) (arguing that 
non-sexual harassment is often a major part of a hostile 
work environment). In its appeal, Durham attempts to 
disaggregate the various allegedly discriminatory acts and 
endeavors to cast doubt on each one, arguing that the 
overtly sexual acts did not occur and that the non-sexual 
actions taken against Evans have innocent explanations. 
We conclude, however, that the District Court appropriately 
refused to consider each incident in a vacuum and that its 
findings are not clearly erroneous. 
 
III. Employer Liability 
 
The next issue on appeal is whether Durham may be 
held liable for its supervisors' acts. Although Durham 
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presents extensive evidence and argument about its anti- 
harassment policies, we find that they are not relevant to 
this case because Evans's supervisors took tangible adverse 
employment action against her.4 
 
A. Liability under Ellerth and Faragher5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We must briefly address a certain terminological confusion that 
Durham uses to argue that the District Court made a mistake in finding 
employer liability. At one point, the District Court stated that it did 
not 
see this case as a "disparate treatment" case, but as a "hostile work 
environment" case. Thus, Durham suggests, only evidence of sexualized 
abuse or sexual advances is relevant to Evans's claim, and that evidence 
alone is insufficient. The District Court's characterization lacks 
analytic 
precision. Hostile work environment claims are founded in Title VII's 
prohibition of unequal treatment of men and women; the hostile 
environment here consisted of abuse that a man in Evans's position 
would not have suffered. Perhaps the District Court simply meant that 
there was no other employee who had Evans's abilities and her specially 
negotiated benefits, so that there was no similarly situated person who 
could have been better treated. In any event, the Supreme Court has 
now made clear that labels such as "hostile work environment" are not 
dispositive and that the ultimate issue is whether the plaintiff has 
suffered actionable discrimination based on her sex. See Ellerth, 118 
S. Ct. at 2264. 
 
5. Although Judge Garth concurs in the result reached by Chief Judge 
Becker, he cannot agree that the discussion of when and how the 
affirmative defense provided by the holdings in Burlington Industries, 
Inc. 
v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998), and Chief Judge Becker's attempted clarification 
of that defense, see infra, have a place in the opinion. 
 
As Judge Garth reads the Supreme Court decisions, their holdings are 
unequivocal and are directly applicable to this appeal without extending 
the analysis beyond the facts of this case. Ms. Evans provided proof of 
a tangible adverse employment action (i.e., she was made to leave her 
job), and this action was on the basis of her supervisors' behavior. Here, 
Ms. Evans was the subject of a tangible adverse employment action, the 
District Court found that her supervisors were responsible for her 
constructive discharge and the District Court returned a verdict 
compensating her for the damages she suffered. 
 
This being so, the initial holding in Faragher and Ellerth attaches and 
binds us: "An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized 
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor 
with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee." 
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Durham argues that the District Court applied the wrong 
liability standard because the Supreme Court's recent 
sexual harassment liability decisions substantially 
reshaped the law. In Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme 
Court drew a line between (1) discriminatory work-related 
supervisory acts, such as discriminating against women in 
work assignments to placate pervasive male hostility or 
reprimanding women "in harsh or vulgar terms" while 
merely bantering with men for identical behavior, and 
(2) expressing sexual interest "in ways having no apparent 
object whatever of serving an interest of the employer." 
Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2289. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293. Judge Garth 
believes that is all the Court is called upon to review through the lens 
of 
Ellerth and Faragher and he agrees that the District Court properly 
entered judgment in favor of Ms. Evans. 
 
However, Judge Garth takes no position and disassociates himself 
from the discussion in Section III.A of Chief Judge Becker's opinion 
involving situations and examples where no tangible adverse 
employment action was taken, matters that concern the second holding 
of Ellerth and Faragher. This second holding provides that "[w]hen no 
tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an 
affirmative defense to liability or damages," Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; 
Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293, and specifies the elements that must be 
established for the defense to prevail. (To the extent that Judge Weis in 
his concurring opinion would make an affirmative defense available even 
when a tangible adverse employment action resulted, Judge Garth 
rejects his analysis as being contrary to and in derogation of the 
explicit 
holdings of Ellerth and Faragher). 
 
In the present case, there is no issue that requires resort to the second 
holding, and Judge Garth fears that unnecessary examples and 
discussion, even in an attempt to enlighten the bar and bench, may only 
lead to confusion when it does not clarify the standards to which this 
Court must adhere. In a case such as this one, where Ms. Evans was 
constructively discharged by her supervisors' action after their own 
actionable behavior, the holdings and instruction of Ellerth and Faragher 
are clear: the employer, Durham Life Insurance Company, is 
automatically liable and no affirmative defense is available. The District 
Court so held, and Judge Garth, in accordance with the separate 
opinions of his colleagues, Chief Judge Becker and Judge Weis, agrees 
that the District Court's judgment must be affirmed. 
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The first kind of discrimination, the Court concluded, 
would automatically subject the employer to liability 
because such discrimination is within the scope of the 
supervisor's employment, even if the employer does not 
want the supervisor to discriminate. Acts fall within the 
scope of employment when they are " `of the kind [a 
servant] is employed to perform,' occurring `substantially 
within the authorized time and space limits,' and `actuated, 
at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.' " Id. at 
2286 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency S 228(1) 
(1957) (alteration in original)). The Court further stated that 
"it is accepted that `it is less likely that a willful tort will 
properly be held to be in the course of employment and 
that the liability of the master for such torts will naturally 
be more limited.' " Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2266 (quoting F. 
Mechem, Outlines of the Law of Agency S 394, at 266 (P. 
Mechem ed., 4th ed. 1952)). 
 
The Court, after citing some of the various conflicting 
cases on scope of employment, and concluding that sexual 
harassment by a supervisor is generally not within the 
scope of employment, see id. at 2267, went on to parse the 
second category more carefully. In cases of harassment 
falling outside the scope of employment, the Court found, 
the employer could be vicariously liable when the"tortious 
conduct is made possible or facilitated by the existence of 
the actual agency relationship." Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 
2290. The Ellerth/Faragher "aided by the agency relation" 
test is divided into two categories: 
 
       An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a 
       victimized employee for an actionable hostile 
       environment created by a supervisor with immediate 
       (or successively higher) authority over the employee. 
       When no tangible employment action is taken, a 
       defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to 
       liability or damages, subject to proof by a 
       preponderance of the evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 
       8(c). The defense comprises two necessary elements: 
       (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to 
       prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing 
       behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee 
       unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive 
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       or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or 
       to avoid harm otherwise. . . . No affirmative defense is 
       available, however, when the supervisor's harassment 
       culminates in a tangible employment action, such as 
       discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment. 
 
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; see also Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 
2292-93. 
 
The aided by the agency relationship test is not, however, 
all-embracing. Rather, the Court discusses it only as a 
"starting point." Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2290 & n.3. One 
question is whether we should treat the supervisory acts in 
this case as falling within or without the scope of 
employment, for the scope of employment discussion is 
where the Court began its reformulation of Title VII 
jurisprudence. In a definitional sense, scope of employment 
plays no role in the Ellerth/Faragher test as such. But a 
sexual harassment plaintiff might still argue, in an attempt 
to avoid the affirmative defense, that the harassment she 
suffered falls within the scope of employment because her 
harassers intended, at least in part, to serve their employer. 
For example, the District Court found that McKaskill told 
Evans that she made "too much money for a goddamn 
woman" and that she did not know anything about 
annuities because she was "only a woman." This could 
readily be interpreted as evidencing a belief that women 
were not suited to Durham's business and a purpose to 
serve Durham by ridding it of Evans or at least of the 
qualities that made Evans stand out from other agents, 
which qualities the harassers apparently regarded as linked 
to her womanhood. 
 
Although a scope of employment analysis would be 
theoretically possible here, we apply the Ellerth/Faragher 
aided by the agency relation test. We would have great 
difficulty deciding the case on scope of employment 
grounds in the absence of a specific finding by the District 
Court about the harassers' intent. We therefore believe that 
we can better evaluate Evans's claim by asking whether her 
harassers were aided by the harassment by the agency 
relation. More generally, we suggest that harassment that 
could be analyzed as falling within the scope of employment 
because of a supervisor's biased beliefs about a class of 
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workers--a claim that Evans might be able to make on 
these facts--might be better evaluated in thefirst instance 
under the more specifically delineated standards of the 
Ellerth/Faragher aided by the agency relation test.6 Scope of 
 
(Text continued on page 19) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We note that despite the Court's attempt to attain "categorical 
clarity," 
Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2290, there is a potential overlap between 
harassment falling within the scope of employment and harassment 
aided by the agency relationship, for "scope of employment" and "aided 
by the agency relation" are not hermetically sealed concepts. Both may 
fit the facts of a case, yet point towards dramatically different 
liability 
standards, since only in an "aided by the agency relation" situation is 
the affirmative defense potentially available. 
 
An example will elucidate the point. If a male supervisor routinely 
delivered his reprimands to female employees by way of unwelcome 
remarks and touching while treating male employees with respect, the 
conduct would seem to fall in both categories, since the explicit sexual 
misbehavior would suggest an aided by the agency relationship analysis, 
while the disparate treatment with respect to work-related activities 
would put the problem within the scope of employment. Even though 
unwelcome remarks and touching might be done to gratify the harasser's 
own desires, this situation would fall within the scope of employment 
because the harassment would be the supervisor's manner of giving out 
otherwise authorized reprimands to women. Giving reprimands is clearly 
within the scope of the supervisor's authority, and the law of agency 
teaches that the manner of doing an authorized act may subject an 
employer to liability even though the employer instructs that the act be 
done differently. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2266. Although we doubt such 
situations occur with any frequency, the example helps develop the issue 
analytically. 
 
The Court's conclusion that sexual harassment will ordinarily fall 
outside the scope of employment connotes an expectation that sexual 
harassment is often connected only opportunistically to the work 
environment--that is, that supervisors' harassment usually does not 
have any inherent relationship to the fact that the women targeted are 
working women. However, there may be cases in which a harasser 
thinks that he is doing what is best for his workforce when he deploys 
sexual harassment as a weapon to drive female workers away. See, e.g., 
Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(finding that a supervisor used sexual harassment to reprimand a female 
employee for her perceived failings as a worker rather than to fulfill his 
desires). There are other cases in which sexual harassment seems 
fundamentally connected to the work situation, as when it is part of a 
campaign against women in nontraditional jobs. See, e.g., Annis v. 
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County of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 1994); Bohen v. City of East 
Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Schultz, supra, at 
1755-61 (suggesting that a desire to preserve a masculine image of work 
often motivates sexual harassment). A supervisor who dislikes women for 
personal reasons may be predisposed to believe, however wrongly, that 
his employer would be better off without them, and his harassing acts 
could therefore be thought to fall within the scope of employment. 
Sexual harassment by co-workers may follow the same pattern and 
create the same analytic difficulties. 
 
The distinction between acts within and without the scope of 
employment would turn on a fact finder's perception of whether the 
supervisor believed that he was acting, at least in part, in his 
employer's 
interests, perhaps because he believed that men were better workers. Yet 
it will often be difficult to distinguish personal misogyny falling 
outside 
the scope of employment from misogyny directed at female workers. 
Does a supervisor who satisfies his sexual urges by targeting women he 
perceives as worthless to his employer's business act sufficiently within 
the scope of his employment? 
 
It is therefore difficult to reconcile intent as the touchstone of "scope 
of employment" with Ellerth's blunt statement that "[t]he general rule is 
that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope 
of employment." Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267. We could, of course, 
understand this as a factual prediction, particularly given the variety of 
cases discussed--and not completely reconciled--in the two opinions. 
See id. at 2266-67; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2286-87. But we also 
consider this statement in light of Faragher's cogent explanation that 
"scope of employment" is ultimately a question of law, not fact, 
expressing a court's conclusion that it is appropriate to hold an employer 
liable for its agents' acts in a particular case. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. 
at 2287-88. 
 
In Faragher itself, supervisors, in the course of carrying out their 
supervisory duties, repeatedly subjected female lifeguards to uninvited 
and offensive touching and to lewd and discriminatory remarks. See id. 
at 2280. The Court rejected the argument that harassment is a risk that 
employers should fairly be required to bear as a cost of doing business 
and that this kind of harassment should therefore be treated as falling 
within the scope of employment. See id. at 2288-89. Instead, the Court 
found that it would be preferable as a matter of social policy to apply 
the 
aided by the agency relation test to the facts of that case. See id. at 
2292. In short, "scope of employment" is not a sharply delineated 
concept in law or logic, and that is what makes it so troublesome. We 
 
                                18 
  
employment remains an elusive concept, while the Supreme 
Court has given us clearer instructions on how to 
determine liability under the aided by the agency relation 
standard. We are also mindful of the Supreme Court's 
stated reason for formulating the affirmative defense, the 
need to give employers incentives to establish anti- 
harassment programs, see Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270, and 
believe that too broad an interpretation of scope of 
employment might make effective anti-harassment 
programs irrelevant to employer liability in many hostile 
environment cases, undermining the Court's intent. 
 
However, we need not resolve the almost metaphysical 
questions surrounding scope of employment today, for 
under Ellerth and Faragher's aided by the agency relation 
test, sex-based mistreatment by a supervisor--whether 
overtly sexual or facially neutral and whether motivated by 
lust or by dislike--creates automatic liability when it rises 
to the level of a tangible adverse employment action. The 
Court squarely held that, when there is a tangible adverse 
employment action or the employer fails to make out its 
affirmative defense, it is fair and just to hold the employer 
responsible for harassment. A supervisor can only take a 
tangible adverse employment action because of the 
authority delegated by the employer, see Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 
at 2269, and thus the employer is properly charged with 
the consequences of that delegation.7 As we will now 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
also note our belief that the aided by the agency relation test is 
similarly 
a product of legal and policy considerations, and the Court may yet have 
occasion to revisit the issue to clarify the remaining questions. 
 
7. Concomitantly, we observe that, if the employer does not prove that it 
exercised due care and that the employee's failure to use its safeguards 
was unreasonable, the harassment can fairly be said to have been 
facilitated by the power delegated to the supervisor, and thus aided by 
the agency relationship. Conversely, if there is no tangible adverse 
employment action and the employer does prove due care and 
unreasonable employee behavior, the employer's anti-harassment efforts 
and the opportunities for redress it offered a harassed employee will 
generally justify the conclusion that the employer should not be required 
to bear the costs of supervisory harassment. That is, the aided by the 
agency relation standard seems to us to reflect a value judgment, not a 
 
                                19 
  
explain, Evans suffered tangible adverse employment 
action. Hence we find that the evidence here easily satisfies 
the Ellerth/Faragher aided by the agency relation test.8 
 
B. Tangible Adverse Employment Action 
 
The Supreme Court has defined a tangible employment 
action as "a significant change in employment status, such 
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing 
a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2268. 
According to Durham, none of the behavior described by 
Evans constitutes a tangible adverse employment action, 
and thus it is entitled to prevail on its affirmative defense. 
Forcing Evans to vacate her office is not tangible, Durham 
posits, because no other agent had a private office, and 
because she kept the office until she resigned. 
 
We disagree. First, the District Court found, and Durham 
does not dispute, that a secretary and a private office were 
specific, negotiated conditions of Evans's move to 
Durham/Peoples. Evans also testified that, given the way 
she dealt with her accounts, a secretary was necessary to 
enable her to work successfully. Durham entirely ignores 
the loss of Evans's secretary, who was paid $20,000 per 
year--hardly a small sum. Given Evans's need for office 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
natural category, balancing the employer's right to be free from 
automatic liability against employees' right to a workplace that 
discourages and redresses harassment. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 
2291. Thus, for actionable harassment that occurs without any tangible 
employment action, the aided by the agency relation test may be 
tantamount to the failure of the employer's affirmative defense, which 
forms the contours of the liability test. The affirmative defense remains 
a defense and not an element of the plaintiff's case because the burdens 
of production and proof remain at all times on the employer, but the 
liability test as a whole is expressly designed to encourage effective 
anti- 
harassment policies. 
 
8. There are other bases for liability that are not relevant to our 
decision 
today: cases in which the harasser's high rank makes him the 
employer's alter ego; cases in which the employer intended the 
harasser's conduct; cases in which the employee reasonably, but 
wrongly, believes that the harasser is a supervisor; and cases in which 
the employer is negligent. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267. 
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support to sustain her successful way of doing her whole 
life insurance business, depriving her of a secretary and an 
office could constitute a tangible adverse action even if 
none of the other agents had negotiated for those benefits. 
Cf. Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 
510-11 (3d Cir. 1996) (rejecting the claim that the 
uniqueness of an employee's position created an extra 
burden on the plaintiff to prove discrimination). Finally, 
Evans resigned when her office was stripped from her and 
her files went missing. The fact that she kept the office 
until she quit does not make the deprivation of the office 
meaningless. Under Durham's theory, any substantial 
adverse action, such as a demotion in authority and pay, 
would not be a tangible adverse employment action if it led 
the affected employee to quit before the demotion took 
effect. This is contrary to Title VII doctrine, which 
recognizes a constructive discharge under such 
circumstances. See Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 
885 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 
Durham also asserts that Evans's missing files cannot be 
an adverse employment action. The District Court, by 
contrast, found that it was impossible for Evans to work 
without her files. If the files were vital to her work, the 
District Court could find that their disappearance under 
suspicious circumstances was a tangible adverse 
employment action.9 Although direct economic harm is an 
important indicator of a tangible adverse employment 
action, it is not the sine qua non. If an employer's act 
substantially decreases an employee's earning potential and 
causes significant disruption in his or her working 
conditions, a tangible adverse employment action may be 
found. See Booker v. Budget Rent-a-Car Sys., 17 F. Supp. 
2d 735 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. After Evans left, Heyman had possession of money orders and cash 
that he could only have gotten from Evans's files. In view of the other 
evidence in the case, Durham's control over thefiles would support the 
conclusion that their disappearance was evidence of discrimination. Cf. 
Aman, 85 F.3d at 1083 (missing time cards, false accusations of 
wrongdoing, and others' refusal to cooperate with the plaintiff in doing 
her job helped prove discrimination); Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1473 
(unexplained loss of files was an important element of the plaintiffs' 
harassment claims). 
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Durham further contends that Evans's alleged harassers 
had no control over giving her lapsed books of business. 
Durham states that male agents also had to take lapsed 
books and that Evans ultimately received "lapse relief," 
which meant that her pay was not decreased as much as 
the normal rules would have mandated based on her large 
number of lapsed policies. In addition, Evans had the 
highest guaranteed salary in the agency. As a result, 
Durham argues, the lapse assignments did not constitute 
tangible adverse action. The record suggests, however, that 
lapse assignments came from one or two levels above Evans 
--that is, precisely the levels at which she argues the 
managerial staff was biased against her. The record also 
supports Evans's contention that she was assigned more 
lapsed policies than other (male) agents, so that she was 
treated less favorably than others. As a result of the lapse 
assignments, her earnings were cut almost in half. A 
decrease of that magnitude is surely significant enough to 
be a tangible adverse action.10 We conclude that the loss of 
Evans's office, the dismissal of her secretary, the missing 
files, and the lapse assignments that led to afifty percent 
pay decrease are tangible adverse employment actions 
under Ellerth and Faragher. 
 
On its face, this conclusion would appear to preclude any 
affirmative defense for Durham. Yet Durham makes an 
interesting claim: It contends that the first time someone 
made a discriminatory remark to Evans, she ought to have 
reported it, using the sexual harassment policy. At that 
time, there was as yet no tangible adverse action against 
her. Durham asserts that, if Evans had reported the 
harassment at that point, it would have investigated and 
stopped the problem, and that it should therefore prevail on 
its affirmative defense. However, we decline to investigate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Evans hotly disputed the claim that she was offered lapse relief, and 
the district judge was entitled to credit her testimony. Evans's high 
guaranteed salary is also less relevant than Durham claims. Most of her 
earnings were expected to come from commissions; from the testimony, 
it seems that no one expected agents to subsist on the salary guarantee. 
Moreover, the guarantee seems to have been a result of the negotiations 
that brought her to Durham/Peoples, before the management changed 
and those who ultimately harassed her assumed positions of power. 
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whether, if Evans had complained early on, the sexual 
harassment policy at Durham would have prevented the 
tangible adverse actions that occurred afterwards. The 
difficulty of making such a counterfactual inquiry counsels 
against injecting this question into already-complex 
discrimination cases, particularly at the appellate level with 
a closed record. While we need not decide the question 
now, we are fearful that, were we to allow an affirmative 
defense every time an employer could argue that the 
plaintiff had some non-tangible notice of discrimination 
before adverse action was taken against her, the 
Ellerth/Faragher distinction between cases with tangible 
adverse action and cases without such action would 
become hopelessly confused. 
 
We note in this regard that it seems untoward to give an 
employer whose supervisors first signal their bias and then 
act on it more protection than an employer whose 
supervisors begin with tangible adverse action. This is 
particularly true because the plaintiff's evidence that 
adverse action was sex-based will often include evidence of 
prior discriminatory behavior; Durham's proposed standard 
would have the perverse effect of putting a greater burden 
on plaintiffs who had extensive evidence of discrimination. 
It would also make the affirmative defense applicable in 
quid pro quo cases, since threats generally are made before 
they are acted upon and put their recipients on notice of 
what is coming next. Yet that is exactly the opposite of the 
holding of Ellerth. The Ellerth/Faragher rule is clear: When 
harassment becomes adverse employment action, the 
employer loses the affirmative defense, even if it might have 
been available before. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293 ("No 
affirmative defense is available, however, when the 
supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible 
employment action . . . ." (emphasis added)); Ellerth, 118 
S. Ct. at 2270 (same); id. at 2269 ("When a supervisor 
makes a tangible employment decision, there is assurance 
the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency 
relation. . . . Whatever the exact contours of the aided in 
the agency relation standard, its requirements will always 
be met when a supervisor takes a tangible employment 
action against a subordinate."). If there is some scenario 
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that will permit such a legal strategem, it does not appear 
in this case. 
 
1. Supervisory Authority 
 
Durham contests the District Court's finding that 
McKaskill was Evans's supervisor. If he was not a 
supervisor, his acts cannot subject Durham to automatic 
liability. Although we think that the other evidence of 
harassment is sufficient to hold Durham liable, we reject 
Durham's interpretation of McKaskill's supervisory 
authority. The District Court could reasonably have relied 
on witnesses, including McKaskill, who testified that 
McKaskill was part of the ruling "triumvirate" in Evans's 
office. As an associate Customer Service Unit Leader, he 
was two levels above Evans according to Durham's own 
chart. He was part of the three-person team that decided to 
get Evans's direct supervisor to strip her office from her 
and to instigate Durham's lawsuit against her. In general, 
complete authority to act on the employer's behalf without 
the agreement of others is not necessary to meet Title VII's 
agency standard for supervisor liability. See Bonenberger v. 
Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 23 (3d Cir. 1997). That 
McKaskill might not have had the authority to act alone did 
not mean that he was without supervisory authority over 
Evans. 
 
C. Pervasiveness and Severity of the Harassment 
 
Durham next claims that, as a matter of law, the 
incidents described by Evans do not rise to the level of 
severity and pervasiveness needed to find a hostile 
environment. Durham characterizes the events to which 
Evans testified as "sporadic misbehavior." However, it is 
settled law that courts should not consider each incident of 
harassment in isolation. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1484. 
Rather, a court must evaluate the sum total of abuse over 
time. Evans has done more than identify isolated incidents 
of what Durham characterizes as "horseplay." She has also 
testified to discriminatory statements and actions that the 
court found to be sex-based. As a whole, the facts support 
the District Court's finding of a hostile work environment. 
 
Durham also claims that most of the conduct of which 
Evans complains occurred after her employment ended and 
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thus cannot sustain a hostile work environment claim. We 
understand the District Court to have found that 
harassment took place on the basis of Evans's sex, both 
before and after she left Durham. See Durham Life Ins. Co. 
v. Evans, Nos. 94-801 & 95-2681, slip. op. at 16 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 4, 1997) ("The intimidation and harassment did not 
end with her resignation."). At all events, the sexual 
misconduct, sexist remarks, loss of Evans's negotiated 
privileges, and other events that took place before Evans 
left Durham are themselves sufficient to sustain a hostile 
work environment claim. Taken as a whole, the District 
Court's findings indicate an environment that rises to the 
level of pervasiveness and severity required tofind a hostile 
work environment. The post-employment actions are also 
significant; we address them infra Subsection IV.A.3. 
 
IV. Back Pay 
 
A. Evans's Entitlement to Back Pay 
 
Title VII allows back pay awards when an employee does 
not leave her employment voluntarily. In this case, Evans 
must establish that she did not quit voluntarily; that is, 
that she was constructively discharged because a 
reasonable person would have found her working 
conditions intolerable. Durham contends that any 
actionable harassment occurred five to seven months before 
Evans left and thus that Evans deserves no back pay. The 
District Court found otherwise. According to itsfindings, 
the disappearance of Evans's files and the deprivation of 
her office right before she left constituted the culmination 
of a series of harassing events, making a formerly 
unpleasant job unbearable. 
 
Durham argues that Evans was not constructively 
discharged when she was forced to follow an office policy 
forbidding agents from having their own offices, the event 
that precipitated her departure. We disagree, for essentially 
the same reasons that we conclude that Evans suffered 
adverse employment action. Constructive discharge exists if 
"the conduct complained of would have the foreseeable 
result that working conditions would be so unpleasant or 
difficult that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes 
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would resign." Goss, 747 F.2d at 887-88. Goss found that 
a reassignment to a less lucrative territory could constitute 
a constructive discharge, based on the substantial pay cut 
involved and the employee's loss of confidence in herself 
and her employer. See id. at 888-89. The facts here are 
quite similar. Although there is no need for a "straw that 
broke the camel's back" when the discrimination has 
continued over an extended time, see Aman, 85 F.3d at 
1084, the loss of Evans's office and files constituted a 
substantial worsening of her working conditions at 
Durham. The District Court found that she could hardly 
have continued work at all without her files and money 
orders. Thus, the facts as determined by the District Court 
support the conclusion that Evans was constructively 
discharged. 
 
B. The Back Pay Calculation 
 
Back pay calculations are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. See Booker v. Taylor Milk Co., Inc., 64 F.3d 860, 
867 (3d Cir. 1995). Back pay may be awarded even if an 
exact dollar calculation is impossible. See Christopher v. 
Stouder Mem'l Hosp., 936 F.2d 870, 880 (6th Cir. 1991). 
The court may estimate what a claimant's earnings would 
have been without discrimination, and uncertainties are 
resolved against a discriminating employer. See Wooldridge 
v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 875 F.2d 540, 549 (6th Cir. 1989); 
Taylor v. Central Penn. Drug & Alcohol Servs. Corp., 890 F. 
Supp. 360, 370 (M.D. Pa. 1995). 
 
1. Evans's Base Salary 
 
Durham argues that the District Court used the wrong 
base salary for Evans because it used Evans's 1992 salary 
even though she left in 1993. This meant the difference 
between $119,000 and $66,000, or $53,000 per year. 
Durham cites to other cases that used a plaintiff's salary on 
the last day of employment to calculate back pay, even 
though the harassment had preceded that last day. 
Durham's precedents are easily distinguishable, because 
they concern cases of harassment that did not have a 
tangible impact on plaintiffs' compensation. See, e.g., Virgo 
v. Riviera Beach Assoc., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1994). 
If Durham's argument were to be accepted, then it would be 
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to a discriminator's advantage to increase its mistreatment 
from a hostile environment to a decrease in pay, so that 
any ultimate penalty would be minimized. Evans's attempts 
to deal with the discrimination without quitting, despite the 
negative effects on her salary, should not be held against 
her. 
 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
used Evans's salary from 1992, the last full year before the 
discrimination began, as the benchmark. Because Evans's 
salary when she left was less than a nondiscriminatory 
salary would have been, it should not be used as the 
benchmark. See EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 
664, 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1994); cf. Gunby v. Pennsylvania 
Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1988) (back pay 
should be the difference between actual wages and the 
wages the plaintiff would have earned absent 
discrimination). Evans consistently earned $90,000 per 
year in the last few years before she came to Durham, and 
she was a leading producer at Durham, earning $128,000 
and then $119,000. It was reasonable to conclude that, but 
for the discrimination, Evans would have continued her 
outstanding performance. Cf. Goss, 747 F.2d at 889 
(upholding the District Court's calculation of commissions 
lost through discrimination because the estimates were 
reasonably based on the plaintiff's past performance);11 
Gallo, 779 F. Supp. at 808 (calculating back pay on a 
commission basis and taking into account plaintiff's 
demonstrated ability to get commissions). 
 
2. Evans's Earnings at Paul Revere 
 
According to Durham, Evans made $65,955 in 1993, of 
which she earned $15,000 at Paul Revere. At $5000 per 
month, this was more than the $4200 per month she made 
at Durham. Ordinarily, there is no entitlement to back pay 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Goss is particularly apposite, because in that case, as here, the 
employer was undergoing some turmoil that arguably exerted downward 
pressure on everyone's commissions. Exxon objected to the District 
Court's choice of a base year because, it argued, that year was not 
representative of the new order. See Goss, 747 F.2d at 889. The court 
rejected Exxon's claim because the wrongdoer should bear the risk of 
uncertainty, not the victim. See id. 
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when the claimant makes more money at another job than 
she could have made at her former job. Durham suggests 
that Evans is therefore not entitled to any back pay. 
 
There are two reasons that Durham's claim fails. First, 
because we find that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion when it chose 1992 as the benchmark year, it 
follows that Evans was earning almost $10,000 per month 
in the absence of discrimination, and so she did not get a 
"better-paying" job for back pay purposes. Second, Evans's 
success at Paul Revere was short-lived, and ended in 
February 1994. After that, she made substantially less per 
month, and it would be both unfair and illogical--in the 
absence of a finding that she unreasonably failed to 
mitigate her damages--to reduce her award by the sums 
that Durham projects that she could have earned. 
Significantly, the court found that her decline was caused 
by Durham's actions against her, which ultimately led her 
to take disability leave from Paul Revere. Because 
Durham's conduct affirmatively impaired her ability to 
mitigate her damages, it would be inequitable to reduce her 
back pay award in this case. 
 
3. Durham's Post-employment Actions Against Evans 
 
Anticipating this response to Durham's back pay 
argument, Durham contends that there is no support in the 
record for the proposition that adverse actions against 
Evans after her employment ended justify continuing the 
back pay award. In particular, Durham notes that there are 
no findings that it retaliated against Evans for engaging in 
a protected activity. 
 
The District Court apparently did not discuss retaliation 
because it treated the post-employment actions as 
continuing discrimination. Post-employment actions by an 
employer can constitute discrimination under Title VII if 
they hurt a plaintiff's employment prospects. See Passer v. 
American Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(ADEA case); London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 
816 (9th Cir. 1981); Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac 
Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 711, 719-21 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Daley v. St. 
Agnes Hosp., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
The lawsuit against Evans and the complaints to the 
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Insurance Department had the potential to affect her ability 
to sell insurance, and the District Court found that she was 
powerfully affected because of the anxiety created by the 
investigation. This kind of threat to Evans's livelihood is 
sufficiently employment-related to be an employment 
action. See Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 
198 (3rd Cir. 1994) (post-employment threat to a teacher's 
license constituted employment action). The conclusion that 
the post-employment actions were a continuation of the 
initial discrimination seems plausible in light of the finding 
that, during her employment with Durham, her agency 
manager impliedly threatened to file a lawsuit against 
Evans if she were to quit after the discrimination began. 
Furthermore, Durham's conduct in filing suit against Evans 
for replacing sixteen policies while ignoring the conduct of 
a man who transferred 170 policies could support the 
inference that the lawsuit was filed for discriminatory, not 
simply retaliatory, reasons. 
 
Evans further argues that the evidence would support 
upholding the District Court on a claim of post-employment 
retaliatory conduct. Title VII prohibits retaliation against 
employees who engage in a protected activity such as 
stating a claim of discrimination (as Evans did in her 
resignation letter) and filing suit. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-3(a). We agree that the facts found by the District 
Court would support a retaliation claim. Durham, citing Bill 
Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 
(1983), responds that filing a lawsuit against Evans for 
breach of her non-competition agreement cannot form the 
basis of a retaliation claim unless the lawsuit lacked a 
reasonable basis because of Durham's First Amendment 
right to take disputes to the courts. Bill Johnson's, however, 
construed a specific, ambiguous provision of the NLRA 
defining unfair labor practices. Its reasoning has not been 
extended to Title VII, in part because the prohibition on 
retaliation is so explicit and the public policy behind the 
retaliation provision so compelling. 
 
In addition, Durham took other post-employment actions 
besides filing the lawsuit against Evans, and we need not 
rely on the lawsuit to find retaliatory conduct. John 
Heyman, an agency manager, failed to conduct a full audit 
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of Evans's accounts, contrary to industry custom and to 
Durham's own policies. Because Evans's accounts were left 
up in the air, policyholders made inquiries that ultimately 
became complaints when payments that should have been 
prepaid were not made. 
 
Durham states that the "evidence is clear" that the 
complaint letters about Evans came from policyholders and 
were not solicited by Durham. Yet the evidence supports 
the conclusion that it was Durham's unusual inaction that 
set the entire process in motion. Rather than acting in its 
own self-interest and keeping Evans's former clients 
satisfied with their Durham policies, the record shows that 
Durham allowed record-keeping problems to escalate into 
complaints. Durham also sent letters to all of Evans's 
clients that arguably encouraged such complaints. The 
complaints only targeted Evans despite the concurrent 
involvement of a man in 75% of the relevant cases. 12 
 
Most importantly, as a result of the complaints, the 
Pennsylvania Insurance Department investigated Evans. 
Durham contends that the investigation occurred without 
Durham's urging. But that is a disputed issue and, at all 
events, it could be inferred that the investigation would not 
have happened but for Durham's arguably discriminatory 
failure to audit Evans's accounts properly. In addition, 
unprompted by the Insurance Department, Heyman sent it 
information mistakenly indicating that Evans had 
committed a serious offense. Evans testified to the 
seriousness of the resulting charges and the negative 
effects this series of events had on her ability to continue 
her insurance work. 
 
These facts resemble those in other cases in which courts 
have found retaliation when an employer instigates 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Heyman and others testified that they refused to return phone calls 
when anyone called to ask about Evans's policies after she left. Durham 
apparently reads this testimony to suggest that its employees did not 
instigate any complaints. After the somewhat disturbing letter they sent 
to Evans's former customers, however, policyholders might well be more 
likely to write out a complaint, and to name the only person whose name 
they knew, at least if no one else at the insurance company would 
answer questions about the policies. 
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government action against a former employee. See Berry v. 
Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(encouraging a person to report the suspected crime of a 
former employee can be retaliation); Beckham v. Grand 
Affair, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 415, 419 (W.D.N.C. 1987) 
(reporting a former employee for criminal trespass can be 
actionable retaliation); see also EEOC v. Virginia Carolina 
Veneer Corp., 495 F. Supp. 775, 777 (W.D. Va. 1980) (filing 
a state law defamation claim against an ex-employee is 
impermissible retaliation), appeal dismissed, 652 F.2d 380 
(4th Cir. 1981). These cases reasoned that such instigation 
could constitute a retaliatory adverse employment action 
because government investigation can hurt a person's 
employment prospects. The same reasoning would support 
a finding that post-employment attempts to get a person 
investigated can be employment discrimination. Cf. 
Charlton, 25 F.3d at 198 (suggesting that post-employment 
action might sustain a claim of discrimination as well as of 
retaliation). 
 
In sum, we conclude that Durham's post-employment 
acts against Evans at the very least prevent Durham from 
arguing that Evans unreasonably failed to mitigate her 
damages, which is the only way Durham could avoid a back 
pay award under these circumstances.13  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Evans argues that the District Court erred by miscomputing her 
back pay. Durham responds that she should have made a post-trial 
motion to correct the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b). Rule 59(e) 
would be more appropriate, as Rule 52(b) concernsfindings and their 
effects on the judgment rather than errors in the judgment alone, but 
the general point is well taken. See Perez v. Cucci, 932 F.2d 1058, 1059 
(3d Cir. 1991) (Rule 59(e) should be used to challenge inclusion of back 
pay award). The miscomputation alleged is a bit confusing, since Evans 
argues that the court attributed too much to her in employer matching 
pension funds and then too little in lost compensation, resulting in a 
figure that was in total too low. It is not clear how she derived this 
calculation, because the District Court's award does not set forth 
amounts for specific categories of loss. This does not seem to be a 
clerical mistake, which would be correctable under Rule 60(a). Back pay 
is within the discretion of the District Court, and we do not have reason 
to conclude that the District Court abused its discretion. 
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V. The Collective Bargaining Agreement and the 
Covenant Not To Compete 
 
Durham appeals the dismissal of its claim against Evans 
for breach of her noncompetition agreement, which was 
part of her employment contract under the former collective 
bargaining agreement. Durham also contends that the 
agreement required Evans to pursue a grievance rather 
than litigating her harassment complaint as a counterclaim 
in the lawsuit against her. We reject these arguments 
because they are contradicted by the District Court's fact 
findings, which are not clearly erroneous. 
 
A. The Covenant Not To Compete 
 
The District Court found that Biancardi, the regional vice 
president who was handling the negotiations with the 
union, told Evans and others that the covenant not to 
compete was abrogated and that the union contract, which 
had incorporated the noncompetition covenant, was not in 
effect. This finding was not clearly erroneous. The District 
Court further concluded that Biancardi, as a regional vice 
president and an official negotiator with the union, had 
authority to bind Durham by his statement. Evans was 
entitled to rely on his representation that the covenant no 
longer bound her. Although Durham argues that the 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was in effect, it does 
not contest this latter finding. Given Biancardi's position of 
authority, we agree with the District Court that Durham 
was estopped from enforcing the covenant not to compete 
against Evans. 
 
B. Grievance Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement 
 
Durham argues that the CBA remained mostly in effect 
during the new contract negotiations. Even though the CBA 
had formally expired, Durham avers, Evans was required to 
grieve instead of filing suit because both the company and 
the union treated the CBA as if it were still in effect. The 
District Court found that the CBA had been abrogated 
when Durham unilaterally decreased agents' compensation. 
Durham argues that the union acceded to the change and 
suggests that, if the District Court had been correct, the 
union certainly would have filed an unfair labor practice 
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charge.14 There are many reasons the union might not file 
a charge or grievance it was legally entitled tofile; in the 
midst of the upheaval caused by Durham's management 
changes, the union might have preferred to attempt to 
resolve disputes amicably. The important point is that the 
District Court did not clearly err when it found that the 
compensation was not changed by mutual agreement, even 
though the union ultimately acquiesced. 
 
We are also satisfied that the District Court did not 
clearly err in finding that Biancardi had the authority to 
bind Durham when he told Evans that the CBA was no 
longer effective. Employer repudiation generally estops an 
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14. Paradoxically, this seems to be a concession that the arbitration 
clause was no longer in effect, since only then would an unfair labor 
practice charge be the appropriate remedy for a compensation change. 
Under Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991), an 
arbitration clause does not generally continue in effect after a CBA 
expires. If the employer makes a unilateral change in benefits instead of 
bargaining, a union must generally file an unfair labor practice charge 
rather than arbitrating. The issue is complicated by Luden's Inc. v. Local 
Union No. 6, 28 F.3d 347, 355-56 (3d Cir. 1994), not cited by the parties. 
Under Luden's, an arbitration clause in a lapsed CBA will continue in 
effect until one side clearly indicates through words or conduct that it 
no 
longer wishes to be bound. The termination of the CBA does not 
generally signal an intent to abandon arbitration, and discontent with 
other aspects of the CBA (such as compensation provisions) does not 
mean that an arbitration obligation ends when the CBA terminates. See 
id. at 356. Biancardi's acts take this case out of the ambit of Luden's. 
We also point out, although the parties have not done so, that it is not 
clear that the CBA, even if it remained in effect, would require Evans to 
grieve instead of filing suit. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 
U.S. 36 (1974). Alexander has been limited by Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), but that decision did 
not address the situation in which a CBA, negotiated to enforce collective 
rights, requires arbitration; it concerned an agreement directly between 
employer and employee limiting individual statutory rights. See Nieves v. 
Individualized Shirts, 961 F. Supp. 782, 790-92 (D.N.J. 1997). The 
Supreme Court recently declined to decide whether an explicit waiver of 
federal statutory rights could be enforced, see Wright v. Universal 
Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998), and, as we resolve the 
arbitration issue on other grounds, we decline to address the issue 
today, especially as the parties have devoted no argument to the law in 
this area. 
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employer from claiming that a plaintiff should have grieved 
first. See Hendricks v. Edgewater Steel Co., 898 F.2d 385, 
388 (3d Cir. 1990); Garcia v. Eidal Int'l Corp., 808 F.2d 717, 
722 (10th Cir. 1986) (where, as company ownership was 
changing, the new company did not explicitly repudiate 
arbitration but did indicate that the contract no longer 
existed, an inference of repudiation was justified); Kaylor v. 
Crown Zellerbach, Inc., 643 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(company's lawyer denied that company was bound by 
CBA; company was estopped from demanding that plaintiffs 
grieve before litigating); Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply 
Co., 464 F.2d 870, 975-76 (3d Cir. 1972) (when the 
employer first stated that it was working under the old 
contract and then said no contract existed, it had 
repudiated the contract and grievance was not required). 
 
VI. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
 
Durham argues that the $100,000 awarded for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") is 
preempted by Pennsylvania worker's compensation law, 
which provides that worker's compensation is the exclusive 
remedy for injuries arising in the course of a worker's 
employment. See 77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 481(a). The 
worker's compensation law excepts from its preemptive 
scope employee injuries caused by the intentional conduct 
of third parties for reasons personal to the tortfeasor and 
not directed against him as an employee or because of his 
employment. See id. S 411(1). Cases interpreting 
Pennsylvania law are split on the propriety of allowing IIED 
claims for sexual harassment on the job. Courts have 
allowed such claims where the injury arose from 
harassment "personal in nature and not part of the proper 
employer-employee relationship." Hoy v. Angelone, 691 A.2d 
476, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), aff'd on other grounds, 720 
A.2d 745 (Pa. 1998); see also Schweitzer v. Rockwell Int'l, 
586 A.2d 383, 391 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (harassment is 
personal and not part of the legitimate employer/employee 
relationship). 
 
Other cases, however, have found preemption in similar 
circumstances. See, e.g., Hicks v. Arthur, 843 F. Supp. 949, 
958 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (harassment of a group of black 
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employees did not stem from "personal animosity" and any 
black would have been discriminated against, so IIED was 
preempted). In Winterberg v. Transportation Insurance Co., 
72 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 1995), we concluded that egregious 
misbehavior in handling a worker's compensation claim 
was preempted because the Pennsylvania law has a broad 
intent to preempt common law torts "in matters arguably 
connected with work-related injuries." Id. at 322. The 
attempt to harm Evans, a "successful woman," was 
arguably directed at Evans as an employee, since it 
stemmed from Evans's success at Durham.15  
 
Evans responds that her IIED claim is not preempted 
because many of the acts she found so devastating 
occurred after she left Durham. The District Court 
considered this quite relevant. Claims for damages arising 
from post-employment conduct have been found not to be 
preempted by workers' compensation laws in other 
jurisdictions.16 We are not convinced, however, that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We thus suspect that a claim of Evans's sort would be preempted. 
We understand Pennsylvania law to extend worker's compensation 
preemption to personal animosity that develops from work-related 
events. See Hammerstein v. Lindsay, 655 A.2d 597, 601 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1995) (where animosity develops because of work-related disputes, 
worker's compensation is the exclusive remedy); Shaffer v. Procter & 
Gamble, 604 A.2d 289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (where an employee was 
injured on the job and wrongfully denied treatment, IIED was preempted 
because it could have happened to any employee who got injured); cf. 
Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Co., 112 F.3d 710, 723 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(discussing the Delaware Supreme Court's determination that similar 
IIED suits are preempted under Delaware worker's compensation law). 
Sexual harassment is a well-recognized workplace problem, the kind of 
thing employers must be prepared to combat. Because it is like other 
workplace hazards, we suspect that Pennsylvania would find IIED claims 
based on this kind of harassment to be preempted. But we cannot be 
sure, and we express no opinion as to whether an IIED claim for 
harassment more disconnected from the work situation would be 
preempted, for example where a supervisor sexually assaulted an 
employee or stalked her outside of work. Ellerth  and Faragher may also 
have an impact on this area of the law, as those cases to some degree 
render the distinction between employment-related and purely personal 
discriminatory motives irrelevant to employer liability. 
 
16. See Caldwell v. Federal Express Corp., 908 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D. Me. 
1995); Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Ky. 1996); Cagle v. 
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post-employment actions in this case, distinguished from 
what went before, are sufficiently egregious on their own to 
rise to the level of IIED, although Durham did not raise this 
issue in its papers. 
 
We need not rule on the sufficiency of the post- 
employment conduct, however, because we hold that the 
emotional distress award may be sustained under 42 
U.S.C. S 1981a(b)(3), which authorizes compensatory 
damages under Title VII for "emotional pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, 
and other nonpecuniary losses." The District Court's 
findings are adequate to meet the standard for recovery of 
damages for emotional harm under Title VII.17 At oral 
argument, counsel for Durham conceded as much. See 
Murray v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 143, 157 
(3d Cir. 1998) (where the jury's implicit findings were 
consistent with the correct legal standard despite incorrect 
instruction, its verdict could be upheld on appeal). 18 
 
Conclusion 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be affirmed. Costs shall be taxed against 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee Durham. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Burns & Roe, Inc., 726 P.2d 434, 439 (Wash. 1986). But see Bertrand v. 
Quincy Market Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., 728 F.2d 568, 572 (1st 
Cir. 1984) (where most of the offensive conduct took place before 
employment ended, IIED was preempted under Massachusetts law); Ely 
v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1422, 1429 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (IIED for 
post-employment acts was preempted). 
 
17. Although we are skeptical that the facts of this case are sufficiently 
egregious to establish IIED, see Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745 (Pa. 
1998), Durham does not contest the adequacy of Evans's claim on 
appeal, only its legal availability. 
 
18. Evans also appeals the decision not to award punitive damages 
against Durham. This was not an abuse of the District Court's discretion 
and we will not overturn it on appeal. See East Coast Tender Serv. v. 
Robert T. Winzinger, Inc., 759 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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WEIS, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
Relying on language in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998), the majority concludes that 
because the harassing supervisors took adverse 
employment action, defendant Durham may not present a 
defense based on the plaintiff's failure to utilize the 
employer's grievance procedure. 
 
The majority correctly observes that the Ellerth  and 
Faragher opinions distinguish between situations in which 
tangible adverse employment action occurred and those in 
which it has not (i.e., a sexually hostile environment but no 
tangible adverse action). See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; 
Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93. This distinction, used in 
the context of defining the scope and imposition of 
vicarious liability, is understandable and readily applied. 
The case before us, however, has elements of both a hostile 
environment claim and a claim for discriminatory adverse 
employment action and may appropriately be termed a 
"mixed" one. In these circumstances, it is insufficient 
simply to point to the distinction; Ellerth and Faragher 
compel discussion of other considerations. 
 
Faragher emphasized that Title VII's primary objective "is 
not to provide redress, but to avoid harm." 118 S. Ct. at 
2292 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 
417 (1975)). The Court observed that a defense structured 
to recognize the employer's affirmative obligations would 
implement clear statutory policy by rewarding employers 
who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty and 
help prevent sexual harassment. See id. (discussing Title 
VII, and the regulations and policies of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission). 
 
Similar language appears in Ellerth. There, the Court 
reiterated that Title VII encourages the creation of anti- 
harassment policies and effective grievance procedures. See 
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. As the Court observed, "[w]ere 
employer liability to depend in part on an employer's effort 
to create such procedures, it would effect Congress' 
intention to promote conciliation rather than litigation in 
the Title VII context." Id. Moreover, "[t]o the extent limiting 
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employer liability could encourage employees to report 
harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive, it 
would also serve Title VII's deterrent purpose." Id. 
 
Both opinions also expressly endorse, as consistent with 
Title VII, a framework that places some onus on the victims 
of sexual harassment to report it to their employers. Ellerth 
recognized that "Title VII borrows from tort law the 
avoidable consequences doctrine." Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. 
v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 232 n.15 (1982)). Faragher echoed 
this proposition: "[i]f the plaintiff unreasonably failed to 
avail herself of the employer's preventive or remedial 
apparatus, she should not recover damages that could have 
been avoided if she had done so." 118 S. Ct. at 2292. 
 
Affording employers an affirmative defense serves two 
purposes. First, it supports the imposition of vicarious 
liability when a supervisor subjects a subordinate to a 
hostile environment. Second, it prevents litigation by 
encouraging the creation of effective grievance procedures 
and the settlement of cases, as well as discouraging would- 
be plaintiffs who have failed to take advantage of preventive 
procedures. 
 
Allowing the defense in hostile environment cases serves 
both purposes, but denying it in mixed cases defeats the 
second, arguably where the defense is most needed. Both 
types of harm could be avoided if employers created 
effective procedures and employees utilized them. In a case 
where tangible adverse actions could have been avoided 
had the plaintiff-victim reported the escalating pattern of 
harassment, preclusion of the defense lacks a logical 
foundation. 
 
In this case, the plaintiff experienced harassment over a 
period of many months before any adverse employment 
action occurred. Without belaboring the details, it appears 
that the various harassing incidents occurred in March, 
April, May, June and July 1993. The tangible adverse 
employment actions discussed by the majority, however, 
occurred later: plaintiff's secretary was not discharged until 
July 1993 and the plaintiff did not lose her office or her 
files until September 1993. 
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Defendant Durham argues that had the plaintiff reported 
the harassing conduct that took place before July 1993, it 
would have had an opportunity to correct the situation and 
thereby forestall the later adverse actions taken by the 
plaintiff's superiors. Given Ellerth and Faragher's exposition 
of the rationale underlying the defense, that argument has 
some force. Unlike the majority, I do not discount that 
argument but believe that the employer has failed to 
establish a right to the defense on an entirely different 
ground. 
 
I would affirm the judgment in this case because Durham 
did not show that its grievance procedure was adequate to 
satisfy the standards set out in Ellerth and Faragher. The 
District Court found that "Evans was never given any 
literature or provided any information about the procedure 
to report sexual harassment and had no idea where such 
information could be obtained." An effective employer 
policy, however, is one that has been disseminated to all 
employees and that provides an assurance that the 
harassing supervisor can be bypassed in registering a 
complaint. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293. Durham's 
policy met neither of these requirements. Therefore, having 
failed to establish the most basic requirement for invocation 
of the affirmative defense, i.e., an effective grievance 
procedure, Durham was not entitled to its protection. 
 
Because I join in all other portions of the majority 
opinion, I would affirm. 
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